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Abstract
Can gender-balanced social norms mitigate the gender differences in competi-
tiveness that are observed in traditional patriarchic as well as in modern societies?
We experimentally assess men’s and women’s preferences to compete in a tradi-
tional society where women and men have similar rights and entitlements alongside
a patriarchic and a matrilineal society which have previously been studied. We
find that, unlike in the patriarchic society, there is no significant gender difference
in the inclination to compete in the gender-balanced society. We also find that
women’s decisions in our experiment are optimal more often than men’s in the
gender-balanced society - opposite to the pattern encountered in the patriarchic
society. Our results highlight the importance of culture and socialization for gen-
der differences in competitiveness and suggest that the large gender-differences in
competitiveness documented for modern societies are a long-term consequence of a
patriarchic heritage.
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1 Introduction
In most modern societies, women are under-represented in leadership positions in vir-
tually all important sectors, including politics (Paxton and Hughes, 2014), corporates
(Izraeli et al., 1994) as well as academia (Morley, 2014). One key factor held responsi-
ble for this asymmetry are systematic differences in the inclination to compete. While
a willingness to compete is essential to advance to prominent positions in polities and
economies organized around competition, men have been found to select into competi-
tive environments about twice as often than women in several economic lab experiments
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2011). These gender differences have raised the con-
cerns of policy makers and researchers alike and suggestions for institutional changes
mediating them range from affirmative action (Niederle et al., 2013) and single-sex edu-
cation (Booth et al., 2018) to priming of women with a feeling of power and control in
competitive situations (Balafoutas et al., 2018).
There has been a debate about whether these behavioral differences are primarily
attributable to biological differences or to the different social and economic roles men
and women fill in society (Gneezy et al., 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). This discourse
is part of a broader nature versus nurture debate about gender differences in economic
and social behavior and outcomes (Ridley, 2003). For competitive behavior, there is
some evidence in favor of a biological basis from evolutionary biology and sociobiology
(Turkheimer, 2004). In contrast, the respective literatures in psychology and sociology
tend to support the view that the observed gender differences are primarily a result of a
sociocultural construct of gender and gender roles (Feingold, 1994).
In experimental economics, a ground-breaking contribution to this subject is the cross-
cultural study by Gneezy et al. (2009). They compare women’s and men’s choices to
compete in a simple lab-in-the-field experiment conducted in two traditional societies
which are selected so as to differ as much as possible in the social norms ruling men’s
and women’s social and economic status. They describe the Maasai in Tanzania as “a
textbook example of patriarchal society.” Acknowledging that truly matriarchal societies
do currently not exist, they contrast the Maasai with the Khasi of northeastern India, who
practice matrilineage – inheritance and clan membership follow the female lineage – and
matrilocality – upon marriage a husband joins the wife’s parental household. Consistent
with the hypothesis that patriarchy discourages women and suppresses their economic
potential, Gneezy et al. (2009) find that Maasai men compete about twice as often as
women, while women are more competitive than men among the matrilineal Khasi. These
findings have been corroborated by Andersen et al. (2013) for adolescents in the Khasi
and the Karbi communities, where the latter are a patriarchal society dwelling in an
agro-climatically similar environment as the Khasi, in northeast India.
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Our point of departure is that lab experiments in modern societies, where men and
women have equal rights and entitlements, and traditional patriarchic societies have found
strikingly similar gender patterns regarding selection into competition – men compete
roughly twice as often as women (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011; Gneezy et al., 2009;
Andersen et al., 2013). On the other hand, the latter two studies also document that
there is no or even an opposite gender difference in a traditional matrilineal society,
where social norms ruling descent, inheritance and married couples’ place of residence
favor women. This pattern is consistent with the view of several feminist writers that
contemporary western societies continue to be largely patriarchic (e.g. Walby, 1990).
Alternatively, even if one accepts the view that gender norms are more balanced in a
modern societies than in a traditional patriarchic society like the Maasai, socialization
and gender behaviors may change more slowly than legal norms, implying that girls
still learn from role models who behave less competitively than men, as in traditional
patriarchy.
An important open question that remains is whether gender-balanced norms, for which
modern societies strive, have the potential to close the gender gap in competitiveness in
the long run. To unravel short versus long-term effects of social norms on the gender
difference in competitiveness, we view modern societies in Europe and the Americas as
ones with patriarchic traditional norms whereas their current norms may or may not be
patriarchic. The above-cited studies by Gneezy, List and coauthors, in contrast, compare
a society in which both past and current norms are patriarchic, to a society where both
past and current norms assign a high social status to women.
To learn more about the effect of gender-balanced norms in the long run, in this
paper we examine preferences for competition in a traditional society where both past
and current norms are gender-balanced and compare them to two previously studied
traditional societies, one with patriarchic and one with matrilineal norms, in the same
area. With this research design we seek to contribute to the debate whether the gender
pattern in competitiveness in modern societies is primarily due to a patriarchic heritage
(‘nurture’), or to innate gender differences (‘nature’). To illustrate, if competitiveness is
similar among men and women in the gender-balanced traditional society, this is evidence
in favor of the importance of culture, because, in our perspective, the principal difference
between a traditional gender-balanced and a modern society is that in the former tradi-
tional and current norms are balanced, whereas in the latter traditional and perhaps also
current norms are patriarchic - even though current de jure norms are balanced. If, on
the other hand, competitiveness in the balanced traditional society is similar to the one in
the patriarchic traditional society, we take this as evidence in favor of the importance of
biological factors since our research design ”controls” for the nurture channel by holding
traditional as well as current norms constant at a gender-balanced realization.
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Following Andersen et al. (2013), we choose to study this question among traditional
societies in India’s northeast. This region is ideal for such a pursuit as, due to the
hilly topography and remoteness and its location at the crossroads of South, East and
Southeast Asia, there is a great deal of cultural diversity in an agro-climatically and
politically homogeneous area of the size of Iceland.
Our research design comprises two steps. First, we identify a traditional society with
gender-balanced norms by systematically coding social norms important for women’s
status in society for all major traditional communities dwelling in two neighboring states
of India’s northeast from the ethnographic atlas People of India (Singh, 1988). To the
best of our knowledge, we are first to explore this important collection, which, for India,
covers many more ethnic groups than the well-known ethnographic atlas by Murdock
(1967). From these data, we construct a patriarchy index, which confirms that the two
communities studied by Andersen et al. (2013), the Karbi and the Khasi, are indeed on
the two extremes of this spectrum. Our analysis also shows that the distribution of this
index is strongly bimodal with the humps at the extremes. Our original objective was
to identify a traditional society in which men’s and women’s rights and entitlements are
symmetric – as in modern societies. A detailed examination of the social norms in this
sample, however, revealed that there is not a single society with roughly gender-symmetric
norms. Regarding lineage, for example, there is no single case of bilateral descent – a
child belongs to her father’s and mother’s clan to similar extents – or equigeniture –
all children, regardless of their sex, inherit an identical share, the default rule in Indian
law (Government of India, 2005). Hence we focus on societies in which both sexes have
similarly important, albeit qualitatively different rights and entitlements.
Among the 26 societies whose norms we code, there is only a single one with balanced
norms in each of the three dimensions we consider, the Dimasa. This society is duolineal,
meaning that a son belongs to his father’s clan and a daughter to her mother’s clan. There
is male equigeniture for paternal properties, which comprise agricultural assets and real
estate, female equigeniture for maternal properties, which include clothes, jewelry and
looms, and equigeniture for household public goods. Finally, the Dimasa practice neolocal
residence, meaning that a couple founds a new residence after the birth of the first child.
For comparison the Karbi, who live adjacent to the Dimasa, practice male primogeniture
(the first-born son inherits all property), patrilineage (all children belong to their father’s
kin) and patrilocality (at least the oldest son stays with his parents and is joined by his
wife), while the Khasi practice female ultimogeniture (the last-born daughter inherits
all property), matrilineage and matrilocality, where at least the youngest daughter stays
with her parents and is joined by her husband.
In a second step we conduct the competition and risk experiments of Gneezy et al.
(Gneezy et al., 2009) with men and women of the Dimasa, Karbi and Khasi communities.
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In this experiment, a subject is rewarded for successful tosses of a ball into a bin. Before
tossing, the subject chooses whether her reward shall depend on her own successes only
or whether she competes and earns a reward only if she succeeds more often than her
(anonymous) competitor.
Our experimental results support the hypothesis that gender-balanced norms remove
gender differences in competitiveness. While, in accordance with earlier research, men
compete almost twice as often as women in the patriarchic society, this gender gap melts
down by two thirds to an insignificant eighteen percent in the gender-balanced society.
In accordance with previous work, women compete 13 percent more often than men in
the matrilineal society.
To assess whether patriarchy leads to worse economic outcomes for women through
their choices, we also analyze the optimality of choices. In regression analyses, where
we control for several potential confounders, we find that women among the patriarchic
Karbi compete too little, making suboptimal choices 33 percent more often than men.
In contrast, there is no ‘under-entry’ into competition among both Khasi and Dimasa
women, who indeed make optimal choices more often than men.
To assess whether these differences in competitive behavior are due to differences in
risk aversion, we also conduct a risk bearing experiment with each subject. While we find
that women are somewhat less willing to bet in a gamble, this gender difference does not
correlate with the social norms determining women’s status across the three societies, as
in Gneezy et al. (2009).
We conclude that, in line with the two studies that have inspired our work (Gneezy et
al. 2009, Andersen et al. 2013), patriarchal norms suppress women’s economic potential
by making them compete too little. In addition, gender-balanced social norms rather
than the extreme of matrilineage and matrilocality suffice to heal gender asymmetries in
behavior and economic outcomes.
Our results support the view that gender-balanced norms predict no difference in
competitiveness across the sexes and that the effect of norms favoring a particular sex
are roughly symmetric. First, the small but positive difference in competitiveness between
men and women, which we find among the Dimasa, is consistent with the ethnographic
atlas’ assessment that their norms still attach a slightly higher social status to men
(“The position of women in the society is almost at par with men”). Second, the fact
that the difference between women and men among the matrilineal Khasi is smaller than
the difference between men and women among the patriarchic Karbi corresponds to the
assessment that truly matriarchal societies no longer exist and that Khasi women do not
generally assume the roles held by men in patriarchal societies (Gneezy et al., 2009). For
example, in the political sphere, Khasi women have had active or passive voting rights
for neither the village council nor the Syiem, the traditional ruler of the Khasi country
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(Gerlitz, 1984).
Our results also support the view that a legacy of patriarchy in modern societies is
primarily responsible for the stark gender differences in competitiveness. Among the
traditional society that we study with gender-balanced norms, the gender difference in
competitiveness is much smaller than in several lab experiments conducted in modern
societies of Europe and North America (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). If a society’s
objective is to decrease this gender gap, our results underline, first, the importance of
de facto social norms, by which we have classified the societies of our study, rather
than provisions toward gender equality that are merely de jure. In this connection it
is important to note that all three communities live under Indian law, which stipulates
equigeniture as default, leaves the choice of first and last names of children entirely to the
parents and makes no provisions for newlyweds’ residence. Second, our findings stress the
importance of the long term: while women’s rights have improved significantly in western
countries only over the last 150 years roughly, gender patterns in competitiveness are still
similar to those in traditional patriarchic societies. In contrast, in the traditional society
that we study, both past and current norms are balanced, and women compete almost
as often as men.
This paper contributes to a literature on the underpinnings of gender differences in
economic behavior by comparing traditional societies with different social norms. Com-
paring societies with stark differences in lineage, inheritance and household formation
provides a unique opportunity to study the effects of social structure on gender differ-
ences in economic behavior and outcomes. With this approach, differences in altruism
have been studied by Gong et al. (2015), risk preferences by Gong and Yang (2012), risk
preferences and gender stereotypes by Pondorfer et al. (2017), public good contributions
by Andersen et al. (2008), and bargaining behavior by Andersen et al. (2018), to mention
just a few. Most closely related to our study are the papers by Gneezy et al. (2009) and
Andersen et al. (2013), who compare gender differences in competitive behavior between
a matrilineal and a patriarchal society.
Our main innovations relative to these papers are, first, that ours is the very first
study to include a traditional society where the social status of the sexes is balanced
in addition to the extremes of a patriarchic and a matrilineal society. We think this is
particularly useful to learn more about the effect of social norms on economic behavior
in modern societies. Second, we take seriously the choice of societies included in our
experiments by showing how the norms in these communities compare to the universe of
traditional societies in the study area.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an
overview of social norms among the ethnic groups populating the western part of India’s
panhandle and describes in some detail the three societies among which we conducted our
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experiments. Section 3 describes our experimental design. We proceed to a discussion of
the experimental results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Societal background
2.1 Social norms among ethnic groups in India’s northeast
We take the two communities in Andersen et al.’s (2013) study as point of departure,
whose members dwell in the two abutting states Assam and Meghalaya, and collect
data on relevant social norms for all traditional communities in these two states. For
this undertaking, we tabulate qualitative information from the ethnographic atlas People
of India (Singh, 1988). This is a multi-volume compendium compiled by a team of
anthropologists coordinated and sponsored by the Anthropological Survey of India, a
government agency reporting to India’s Ministry of Culture. It contains the findings of
a systematic field campaign undertaken between 1985 and 1992, attempting to cover all
distinct cultural and ethnic communities with at least 200 members in India, 4635 in total.
The researchers spent an average of 5.5 days in each community and recorded various
aspects of traditional and current social and economic organization obtained through
first-hand interviews of key informants as well as participant observation. Unlike the well-
known ethnographic atlas by Murdock (1967), in which various cultural and economic
characteristics are tabulated for hundreds of traditional societies world-wide, the People
of India (PoI) volumes include no tabulations.1 Instead, in PoI’s state series volumes,
each community is portrayed in a chapter of three to five pages of text.
With the objective to identify communities whose lifestyles are relatively traditional
and little affected by modernization, we focus on communities listed as “scheduled tribes”
under the Indian Constitution. While India’s constitution itself does not define charac-
teristics of these groups, according to a report by a government commission, the criteria
for classification of a community as scheduled tribe are “primitive traits, distinctive cul-
ture, geographical isolation, shyness of contact with the community at large, and back-
wardness” (Government of India, 1955). The Karbi and Khasi communities studied by
Andersen et al. (2013) are scheduled tribes.
To ensure long-term stability of norms in our sample, we further choose to focus
on communities which have traditionally dwelled in the two states, that is we exclude
recently immigrated communities. Forty communities in the two PoI volumes on Assam
and Meghalaya (Singh et al., 2003, 1994) satisfy this criterion. We further eliminate
1There is a large number of recent papers in economics using Murdock’s Atlas. They all focus on
Africa (Alesina et al., 2019, 2013; Michalopoulos et al., 2018). For India, in contrast, the coverage of
Murdock’s Atlas is far less complete than the People of India. Murdock lists less than 50 societies, while
People of India contains 4635.
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nine communities for which PoI does not mention a population figure. Finally, five
communities are described twice, once for Assam and once for Meghalaya, leaving us
with 26 distinct communities with a population of 3.06 million around the year 1981.2
This compares to a total population of scheduled tribes in the two states of about 3.3
million in 1981.3 Hence our sample covers the vast majority of these two states’ population
belonging to traditional societies thus defined.
We follow Gneezy et al. (2009) and Andersen et al. (2013) and focus on lineage
and residence norms as predictors of women’s competitiveness. Lineage has two not
necessarily congruent aspects, descent and inheritance. Descent indicates to whose kin,
the mother’s or the father’s, the children of a couple belong. Cultural anthropologists
specify kinship as how an individual is related to another set of individuals in a society
and what their social duties and obligations toward these individuals are. According
to Gneezy et al. (2009) as well as Chakraborty and Kim (2010) and Dyson and Moore
(1983), kinship affiliations which are based on the mother strengthen a woman’s position
in the marriage and society. According to Dyson and Moore (1983), who are in turn
citing Fox (1967), “anthropologists believe that the bargaining power of family members
is likely to be influenced by the restrictions on the alliance formation within and across
families and kin groups as defined by different kinship systems. [...] In a patrilineal
society, because consanguine women cannot reproduce the lineage, they are less valuable
as allies; however, in matrilineal societies, because sisters reproduce lineages, they are
likely to form strong bonds. [...] In patrilineal systems, men attempt to gain rights over
sexual, domestic and reproductive services of the wife; in matrilineal systems, men do not
have an incentive to do so because they cannot control lineage reproduction.” If power
relations and agency affect competitiveness, women in matrilineal societies will be more
competitive than their peers in patrilineal ones.
Inheritance norms specify how material possessions are transferred from one genera-
tion to the next (Murdock, 1949). Under patrilineal (matrilineal) inheritance, sons or a
son (daughters or a daughter) inherit the bulk of the parents’ possessions. According to
Gneezy et al. (2009), matrilineal inheritance stimulates greater parental investment and
competitiveness in daughters because “women are in a position to pass on accumulated
wealth, and if competitiveness is differentially rewarded, women who learn competitive-
ness from their mothers will benefit both from their own efforts and from those of their
mothers. [...] The household can gain directly from the long-term successes of their
2For each of the five communities that are portrayed twice, once in the Assam and once in the
Meghalaya volume of PoI, we only consider the set of norms of the more populous of the two sub-
populations.
3The precise population figure for scheduled tribes in the two states is not available from India’s
1981 census because affiliation to scheduled tribes was not recorded for Assam due to political factors.
We arrive at 3.3 million by adding to the 1981 census figure of 1.08 in Meghalaya the geometric mean of
1.60 and 2.87 million, the scheduled tribe population figures for Assam according to the 1971 and 1991
censuses.
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daughters.”
Residence norms specify where a newly-wed couple takes residence. Under patrilo-
cality (matrilocality) the couple settles in or near the residence of the groom’s (bride’s)
parents. Under neolocality the couple founds a new residence. There is also ambilocality,
under which husband and wife continue to live with their respective parents and the hus-
band visits the wife in her home. For matrilocal societies, Gneezy et al. (2009) point out
that “women [...] may choose to imitate the behavior of older women in their households
or successful women in their social circles.” Combined with matrilineal inheritance, “the
fact that women can be raised exclusively for the benefit of their mothers’ and grandmoth-
ers’ households may mean that innate competitiveness does not need to be discouraged
or competitiveness is encouraged.” On the other hand, according to Chakraborty and
Kim (2010), “women tend to live farther from their natal homes and have less support
of their natal family when residence is patrilocal.”
Based on these observations and our own reading of the People of India volumes, we
developed a coding manual as well as a codebook with the objective to derive an ordinal
score for women’s status with respect to each of the three sets of norms just discussed.4
The coding manual contains 18 specific coding assignments (eight for residence, seven
for descent and three for inheritance) for each community, while the codebook maps the
entries resulting from these assignments into three scores, one for each set of norms.
Following the arguments given above as well as the tabulations in Dyson and Moore
(1983) and Chakraborty and Kim (2010), we classified as unfavorable for women (score
of -1) descent and inheritance norms that are patrilineal as well as patrilocal residence
norms. We classify as favorable for women (score of +1) descent and inheritance norms
that are matrilineal as well as matrilocal residence norms. We classify as neutral (score
of 0) double descent systems and inheritance norms which specify either equigeniture
(daughters and sons inherit to equal extents) or entitle daughters to more than just the
mother’s personal belongings in regimes where sons inherit the household’s agricultural
assets. Finally, neolocal and ambilocal residence are also classified under this category.
For the 26 communities characterized above, we had these three sets of norms coded
independently from the two state volumes of PoI (Singh et al., 2003, 1994) by two coders
with backgrounds in economics and archeology, respectively. The coders, who were not
informed about the details of our research project, were also given the option to code a
norm as missing from the PoI text. The rate of disagreement between the two coders
in this exercise was 14 percent, 11 out of 78 (= 26 ∗ 3) cases. In a second step, the
coders were instructed to jointly discuss among themselves and - if possible - resolve the
disagreement cases. This lead to an unanimous resolution of each of these cases; for
4Three flowcharts illustrating the coding and scoring are contained in the online appendix to this
paper. The full coding manual is accessible through Heidelberg University’s data repository heiDATA,
https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de/dataverse/awiexeco.
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three of them (two communities’ residence norms and one community’s descent norm)
the coders agreed that the text does not specify sufficiently clearly the respective norm
and hence these were coded as missing.
Table 1 summarizes the resulting scores together with a patriarchy index, which we
calculate for each community as the sum of the scores assigned for each of the three sets
of norms. Congruent with Andersen et al. (2013), who portray the Karbi and Khasi
communities as archetypes of a patriarchic and a matrilineal society, respectively, our
analysis yields the extreme scores of -3 and 3 for them.
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the patriarchy index for the 23 communities for
which all three scores are non-missing. The left panel is a histogram of the number
of communities for each value of the index. It shows that the bulk of communities in
our study area is patrilocal and patrilineal with index values of −3 and −2 (17 of 23
communities). On the other hand, there are five matrilineal/matrilocal societies, a well-
known peculiarity of India’s northeast, one of them the Khasi. The distribution as a
whole is strongly bimodal with index values of −1 or +1 occurring for none of the 23
communities, and there is only a single community, the Kachari Dimasa of Assam, or
Dimasa for short, with an index value of zero.
The right panel of Figure 1 is a histogram of the populations belonging to each of the
seven realizations of our patriarchy index. It confirms the bimodality encountered in the
left panel and demonstrates that the matrilineal/matrilocal groups are on average more
populous than the patriarchic communities. The population share of the gender-balanced
Dimasa is just a little more than one percent implying that they are a comparatively small
community.
Inspection of the Kachari Dimasa entry in Table 1 shows that, with double descent,
a mixture of duolineal inheritance and equigeniture and neolocality, their norms are
balanced for each of the three categories considered here. In sum, the Dimasa of Assam
are the only society with gender-balanced norms in our sample. We hence choose to
include this group in our experimental sample in addition to the patriarchic Karbi and
the matrilineal/matrilocal Khasi.
2.2 The Dimasa, Karbi and Khasi societies
In this section, we discuss similarities and differences of the communities in our experi-
mental sample in more detail. All of them are quite similar in numerous characteristics
other than the social norms relevant for women’s status and competitiveness. First, all
three are ethnically Mongoloids (Kumar et al., 2004) and also genetically relatively close
(Walter et al., 1987; Das and Deka, 1985; Sikdar, 2016). Second, they live in close geo-
graphic proximity in similar agro-climatic environments. The three villages in which we
have carried out the experiments are located at an altitude of around 900 meters above
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sea level in the hills between central Assam and Meghalaya within a 100-kilometer radius.
Third, all three communities pursue similar economic activities for subsistence. Accord-
ing to Singh (1988), all are primarily engaged in agriculture. This is also confirmed by
our exit survey, according to which close to 90 percent of respondents’ principal activity
is farming (see Table 3).
The Khasi are distinct from the Karbi and Dimasa in two respects. First, the Khasi
speak an Austro-Asiatic language while the Karbi and Dimasa each have a language that
belongs to the Tibeto-Burman group (Kumar et al., 2004). Second, even though spatially
very close to Assam’s Karbi and Dimasa, they settle in the state of Meghalaya. In sum
our impression is that the Karbi and Dimasa are very similar, in all five dimensions just
discussed. The Khasi are similar to the Karbi and Dimasa regarding ethnicity, genetics,
environment and mode of subsistence, but somewhat differentiated regarding language
and the surrounding political regime.
The three communities differ vastly in their social organization. The social norms of
the matrilineal/matrilocal Khasi and patriarchic Karbi are described in detail in Andersen
et al. (2008, 2013) and Gneezy et al. (2009), as well as in Banerjee et al. (2015) and
Mukherjee (2018). Table 2 summarizes the lineage and residence norms of these two
communities. Andersen et al. (2018) confirm that, in the 2010s, Karbi and Khasi people
continue to follow their traditional lineage and residence norms as recorded 30 years ago
for People of India. In addition, from our own circumstantial observations, the Dimasa
appear no less traditional than the neighboring Khasi and Karbi. This gives us confidence
that, in our study societies, ancestral and contemporary norms are largely congruent and
in accordance with the accounts in People of India.
To the best of our knowledge, the Dimasa have not yet been the subject of any study in
economics. We therefore discuss their social norms that are of interest here in some detail.
As elaborated in Singh et al. (2003), the Dimasa have a double descent system, where the
simultaneous existence of both male and female clans is the outstanding characteristic. A
son belongs to his father’s clan and a daughter to her mother’s clan. Among the Dimasa,
there are 42 patri-clans (sengphong) and 40 matri-clans (jaddi or juluk), which strictly
observe clan exogamy in their arranged, monogamous marriages (see also Ghosh, 1965b).
The inheritance norm has elements of a duolineal system as well as equigeniture: male
property, which comprises real estate, agricultural assets and cattle, is equally inherited
by the sons; for female property, comprising clothes, jewelry and looms, there is female
equigeniture (see also Danda, 1978, and Ghosh, 1965a); finally, household assets such as
cooking utensils and dishes count as common property and are inherited equally by sons
and daughters. The rule regarding post-marital residence is neolocality with a temporary
matrilocality component: the couple founds a new home after residing with the bride’s
family till the birth of the first child.
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The classification of the three societies emerging from our patriarchy index as patri-
archic, balanced and close-to-matriarchic is also confirmed by circumstantial remarks in
the respective chapters of People of India, which for the Karbi say “the status of woman is
held to be a little lower than that of man” and “a male child is preferred”, while among
the Khasi “women enjoy a relatively high social position. The birth of a female child
is hailed with great joy.” For the Dimasa, the respective chapter points out that “the
position of women in the society is almost at par with men” and makes no statement on
gender preferences for children.
3 Experimental design and hypotheses
Guided by local government officials’ advice, whom we requested to name villages that are
safe and conveniently located while hosting sufficient numbers of our target population,
we identified two Karbi and six Dimasa villages in Assam’s Karbi-Anglong district and one
Khasi village in Meghalaya’s Ri-Bhoi district, on the border of Assam.5 The experiments
with the Karbi were conducted in the block administration office of Manja town and
with the Dimasa in various public buildings, one in each of the six Dimasa villages. The
experiments with the Khasi took place in a school building of the Khasi village we had
identified, near the town of Nongpho.
We choose to carry out the experiments with representative samples of parents of
school-aged children for two reasons. First, they are prime-aged adults standing in the
phase of their lives where they are economically most productive (Fulford, 2014). There-
fore the economic behavior of this segment of the population is of particular importance
for the economy as a whole. Second, parallel to the experiment reported here, we em-
ployed the subjects to elicit the effects of social norms on sex-specific investments in
children, the subject of a companion paper.6
Regarding sample size, we conducted power calculations taking the estimates in An-
dersen et al. (2013) for adolescent Karbi and Khasi as reference. We focus on the double
difference in competitiveness, between men and women in two communities. For de-
tecting a value of this statistic of 57 percentage points, which is Andersen et al.’s point
estimate, with a power of 90 percent (two-sided test with type I error of five percent),
we calculated a sample size of 64, 32 men and 32 women, per community. We therefore
5For the two communities in Assam, the Karbi and Dimasa, we consulted the administration of the
Lumbajong development block in Manja and selected the Karbi and Dimasa villages close to the town of
Manja in that block. For the Khasi in Meghalaya, we consulted the administration of Ri-Bhoi district in
Nongpho and selected a village in the Umling development block, which surrounds the town of Nongpho.
The different numbers of villages for the three communities result from the villages’ different sizes close
to our two operating bases Manja and Nongpho.
6A crucial feature of that exercise is that subjects have both a school-aged son and daughter and
hence we selected our subject pool accordingly.
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fixed the size of our experimental sample at 192.7
We started out with a demographic census of each of the nine villages. We visited all
355 households in these villages and recorded the age and sex of all household members
as well as the household members’ kinship relations. We identified 166 households with
at least one parent of a daughter who is between 6 and 18 years old and a son in the
same age range. From these households, we randomly drew 32 households for the male
and 32 households for the female sample from each community without replacement – to
ensure that the subject pool does not comprise both spouses of a couple.
We visited each subject in his/her home to convey the invitation. This included
information about the participation fee of Indian Rupees (Rs.) 200, which equals $2.80,
and the place and time of the experiment. Each subject was requested to report at a
specified time at the experimental site, the village school or a public meeting hall, and
we arranged individual transport for each subject. There was no single case of no-show;
all subjects that we had invited participated in the experiments. We are hence confident
that our experimental results are fully representative of the target populations.
We followed the procedures laid out in Gneezy et al. (2009), with the risk task followed
by the competition task. In the risk task, a subject chooses the amount to invest in a
lottery out of an endowment of Rs. 50. The lottery outcome is determined by tossing of a
fair coin with payoffs of zero and three times the stake chosen by the subject, respectively.
In the competition task, the subject throws a tennis ball into a bucket placed 10 feet
away five times. Beforehand she chooses whether her monetary reward for successful
tosses shall depend only on her performance at a rate of Rs. 10 per successful toss or,
in addition, on winning against an anonymous competitor. For a competition’s winner,
the reward per successful toss under the competitive scheme is three times as large as
under the non-competitive one. In case of a tie the payoff under the competitive scheme
is equal to the one under the non-competitive regime.8
To rule out experimenter gender effects, in each session both a male and a female
facilitator was present. The outcome of the risk task was not revealed to the subject
until he/she had made a choice regarding competition and completed the ball-tossing.
7We also calculated the sample size for detecting a double difference of 28.5 percent, which we
hypothesize for the Dimasa and Karbi, or Dimasa and Khasi, respectively. For 80 percent power, this
would have required a sample size of 192 individuals per community, which was beyond our logistic and
budgetary means. For a double difference of 28.5 percent, with 64 subjects per community we have a
power of 36 percent in a two-sided, and of 49 percent in a one-sided test with α = 0.05.
8In addition, to elicit sex-specific investment propensities regarding sons and daughters, we gave each
subject the option to allocate a self-chosen fraction of the participation fee, which would be paid after
completion of all experimental tasks, to schooling items for their children and to state the identity of the
beneficiary child or children. In this process, we were careful not to make gender salient. First, subjects
were not aware that they were invited because of being the parent of both a school-aged boy and girl.
Second, before entering the risk and competition tasks, each subject declared merely the fraction of the
participation fee to be allocated to schooling items. Only in the exit survey, after completion of the risk
and competition tasks, did we record all the subject’s children, including name, age and sex. Subsequent
to that, we asked the subject for the name(s) of the beneficiary child(ren) and choice of schooling items.
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The experiments were carried out in concurrent parallel sessions. To calculate subject
A’s payoff who has chosen to compete in the competition task, her/his performance is
assessed relative to that of subject B concurrently performing the ball-tossing in the room
next door, of whose identity, gender and choice A is not aware.
After accomplishing both tasks, each subject was privately communicated the outcome
and payoffs of the risk and ball-tossing tasks and taken to another location to respond to
an exit survey, followed by payments in cash and in kind.9 Inclusive of the participation
fee, subjects earned Rs. 285 on average, which equals roughly half the official minimum
agricultural daily wage, with a minimum of Rs. 210 and a maximum of Rs. 430.10
Throughout the experiment, the subjects were not informed about the choices of any other
subject. The detailed experimental instructions are contained in the online appendix to
this paper.
Emerging from our main research question we have several ex-ante hypotheses to be
tested with the above designs, relating to the effect of social norms on competitive be-
havior and optimality of decisions across gender. As in Gneezy et al. (2009) the first
behavioral prediction is that males will compete more often than females in the patri-
archal society (hypothesis C1). Second, we expect that this result will be reversed, or
at the least there will be no significant difference in the matrilineal/matrilocal society
(hypothesis C2). Third, going with the view that women’s and men’s attitudes toward
competitiveness are primarily socially formed, we expect no significant gender difference
in the balanced Dimasa society (hypothesis C3). We will test hypothesis C1 statistically
through the null hypothesis that women compete at least as often as men among the
patriarchic Karbi, where the alternative is that men compete more often than women.
This is a one-sided test. We test hypotheses C2 and C3 in two ways; first by conducting
the same one-sided test as for hypothesis C1. Second, for hypothesis C2 (C3) we will test
the null that the gender difference among the Karbi, defined as men’s minus women’s
competitiveness, is not bigger than the corresponding gender difference among the Khasi
(Dimasa). Again, these are one-sided tests.
Regarding the optimality of individual decisions to compete, we consider the same set
of hypotheses for the outcome variable decision interim optimal, which we will introduce
in detail in the following section. Hypothesis O1 states that males will take optimal
decisions more often than females in the patriarchal society. According to O2, this result
will be reversed, or at the least there will be no significant differences in the matrilin-
eal/matrilocal society. And we expect no significant gender difference in the balanced
society (O3).
9See footnote 8.
10For reference, the official daily minimum wage rate for unskilled labor in Assam and Meghalaya was
Rs. 254 and 300 at the time of the experiment, respectively.
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4 Data analysis
4.1 Participants’ characteristics
We present, by community, the participant characteristics from our exit survey, which
include gender, age, marital status, relation to the household head, years of education,
a rough estimate of monthly income and principal economic activities, in Table 3. The
average subject is between 35 and 42 years old. The Khasi are five and seven years older on
average than their Dimasa and Karbi counterparts, respectively, because of later marriage
and child-bearing ages. Average educational attainments are low, with averages between
five and six and a half years. Interestingly, gender differences in education precisely reflect
the relative status of the sexes predicted by our patriarchy index: women have 2.2 years
more than men among the Khasi and 2.2 years less among the Karbi while there is only a
small difference of 0.7 years in favor of men among the Dimasa. According to the income
figures, Khasi subjects appear to be slightly wealthier than the others, but given the
large variation within each community these differences are not statistically significant at
conventional levels. The primary economic activity is farming, which is pursued by close
to 90 percent of both men and women. In line with our objective to achieve homogeneity
across the communities represented in our subject pool, these figures demonstrate that our
subjects are quite similar regarding observable characteristics, perhaps with the exception
of schooling. To account for such observable differences, we also conduct regression
analyses with control variables.
4.2 Experimental outcomes
We provide summaries of the competitiveness experiment’s outcomes in Table 4 and
the upper left panel of Figure 2. Among the patriarchic Karbi, almost 70 percent of
men but only 41 percent of women choose to compete. This difference is significant at
the five percent level. While, with an incidence of 44 percent, women are slightly more
competitive among the duolineal Dimasa, not more than 53 percent of Dimasa men choose
to compete. Finally, only 44 percent of Khasi men compete, which compares to 50 percent
of women. The figures for the Khasi are well in line with the ones obtained by Gneezy
et al. (2009) with 39 and 54 percent, and Andersen et al. (2013) with 41 and 50 percent
among adolescents. Choices among the Karbi are also broadly consistent with the latter
authors’ study, who report 67 and 19 percent among adolescents. The figures from our
experiments imply that the incidence of competitiveness increases monotonically with
the extent of patriarchy for men, while the opposite holds for women. In sum, across
the three communities, the raw data support our ex-ante hypotheses C1, C2 and C3,
and they suggest, in particular, that gender-balanced norms remove gender differences in
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competitiveness.
An obvious concern is whether these differences in behavior could be due to gender
differences in risk preferences across the three communities. The upper right panel of
Figure 2 depicts the amount bet in our risk experiment by community and sex (see
Table 4 for the means). According to these data, women bet 10 to 25 percent less than
men. The gender difference in the amount bet varies little across the societies, however,
and in fact slightly decreases with the extent of patriarchy. If competitive choices were
solely driven by risk preferences, these risk-bearing patterns would predict a negative
correlation between patriarchy and the gender difference in competitiveness – given that
payoffs under the competitive regime are riskier.
Another concern is that there are gender differences in inherent skills regarding the
ball-tossing task and that subjects factor this into their decisions. The center left panel
of Figure 2 graphs the success rates in the competition experiment by community and sex
(see Table 4 for the means). There are significant differences in ability across the commu-
nities, mostly however for men. Both Khasi and Dimasa men hit almost twice as often as
their Karbi counterparts. Men in the two less patriarchic societies are also significantly
better throwers than their female counterparts, especially among the duolineal Dimasa,
where the gender difference is 44 percent (significant at one percent). Interestingly, there
is no such gender difference among the patriarchic Karbi. If competitive choices were
solely driven by expected payoffs and each subject were informed about her own skill
as well as the skill distribution in her community, these patterns would predict greater
gender differences in competitiveness in the balanced and matrilineal societies than in
the patriarchic one.
Previous authors on gender differences in competitiveness have maintained that wo-
men’s lower inclination to compete generally leads to worse economic outcomes for them
(Gneezy et al., 2003). We make an attempt to assess this possibility with our data. We
calculate analytically for each society a subject’s expected payoff as a function of his/her
number of successful tosses and the choice (compete or not compete) in the competition
task. The expectation is taken over the empirical distribution of successes of all subjects
in the respective society. Conditional on the subject’s own successes, we then ask whether
the expected payoff given the subject’s actual decision is not smaller than his/her expected
payoff with the alternative choice in the competition task. If the answer is yes, we call the
subject’s choice in the competition task interim optimal.11 By construction, both compete
and not compete are optimal choices for subjects with zero successes. Among Dimasas
and Khasis, not compete is the unique optimal choice for subjects with one success and
11This approach is similar to the concept of optimality in Anderson et al. (2013). They conduct a
simulation where each subject with her/his successes is repeatedly paired with another, random subject
of the same community. Our calculation yields the limiting outcome of such a simulation as the number
of repetitions approaches infinity.
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compete for two or more successes. For Karbi subjects the unique optimal choice is
compete even with only one success. This difference across the communities derives from
the low aggregate success rate of Karbis relative to the other two communities (see the
center left panel of Figure 2). We further define incidences of over and under-entry into
competition by coding the former (latter) variable as one if a subject chooses compete
(not compete) and this decision is not interim optimal, and zero otherwise.
The center right panel of Figure 2 graphs the interim optimality of decisions in the
competition task by community and sex (see Table 4 for the means). Consistent with
our previous findings on competition and success rates, Karbi women take suboptimal
decisions 30 percent more often than men. Consistent with the hypothesis that patri-
archy makes women take poor decisions by competing too little (O1), the two bottom
panels show that this disadvantage is entirely driven by under-entry. The difference of
19 percentage points is borderline significant with a p-value of 0.11 and similar to the 26
percentage points obtained by Andersen et al. (2013) among Karbi adolescents. In con-
trast, Dimasa and Khasi women’s choices are more often interim optimal than the choices
of their male counterparts (O3 and O2). Moreover, in both societies, the stereotype of
too little entry by women is reversed as under-entry is a little more frequent among men
whereas women over-enter competition slightly more often than men.
4.3 Regression analysis
We test the ex-ante hypotheses introduced in section 3 through regression analyses. This
also allows us to control for various observable characteristics as well as individual risk
attitudes to ascertain that these do not drive the differences across societies we have
manifested in the previous section. We estimate linear probability models where the
choice to compete is the dependent variable. The results for competitiveness are set out
in Table 5. Columns 5 through 10 show that the gender difference in competitiveness is
statistically significant at the five percent level for the patriarchic Karbi, but not for the
Dimasa and Khasi. This pattern obtains regardless of whether controls, including the
amount bet in the risk experiment, are added. The test results for the null hypothesis
that women compete at least as often as men are reported towards the end of the table.
According to the p-values, this hypothesis is clearly rejected for the Karbi but neither for
the matrilineal Khasi nor the gender-balanced Dimasa.
Columns 1 through 4 contain estimations for the pooled data. The patriarchic Karbi
are the reference group throughout and the constant in the first column, where there are
no controls, gives the sample mean for Karbi men. Our interest here is in the Female
interaction terms. The estimate in the line Khasi – Female Interaction says that the
difference in competitiveness between women and men is greater, by 34 percentage points,
among the Khasi than among the Karbi, while the corresponding double difference for
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the Dimasa and Karbi equals 19 percentage points. We test in turn the null hypotheses
whether these double differences are zero or negative. Consistent with the magnitude
of the point estimates, this hypothesis is clearly rejected for the Khasi versus the Karbi
(p=0.03) and, with a p-value of 0.14, the test comes close to a rejection for the Dimasa
versus the Karbi. The addition of control variables in columns 2, 3 and 4 affects neither
the two double differences of interest nor the hypothesis tests in a mentionable fashion.
Overall these results confirm our initial hypotheses that a higher social status of women
reduces the gender gap in competitiveness encountered in patriarchic societies and that
gender-balanced norms rather than the extreme of matrilineal norms suffice to close this
gap.
We now turn to analyzing in more detail gender differences in the optimality of de-
cisions. Toward this, Table 6 is structured like Table 5 with results for the dichotomous
dependent variable Decision interim optimal. An obvious concern regarding optimality
comparisons across communities and sexes is the variation in success rates along these
two characteristics (see the center left panel of Figure 2). We therefore control for suc-
cessful tosses in columns 3, 4, 6, 8 and 10 and take the results set out in the remaining
columns with caution. Columns 6, 8 and 10 show that women make worse decisions
significantly more often than men only among the patriarchic Karbi. In accordance with
our hypotheses O1 through O3, Karbi women make optimal decisions a third less often
than men (column 6) while positive, albeit insignificant differences obtain among the
gender-balanced Dimasa and the matrilineal Khasi (columns 8 and 10). According to
the p-values reported in columns 6, 8 and 10, the hypothesis that women make better
choices than men can be rejected safely for the Karbi but neither for the Khasi nor the
Dimasa. In sum, these regression results support our three ex-ante hypotheses regarding
optimality of decisions.
Turning to the double-differences in optimality, the test results reported in columns 3
and 4 show that the hypothesis that the gender difference (defined as male minus female)
among the patriarchic Karbi is smaller than among the balanced Dimasa is rejected for
one of the two specifications (column 3) and comes close to rejection when the full set of
controls is included (p-value of 0.14 in column 4). Similarly, the analogous hypothesis is
rejected at a level of ten percent for the matrilineal Khasi vis-a-vis the Karbi in column
4 while a borderline p-value of 0.12 obtains in column 3. Taken together, these results
suggest that gender-balanced norms suffice to prevent women from being economically
disadvantaged due to their competitiveness in comparison to men. The pattern of the
optimality results indeed implies that women perform as well under gender-balanced
norms as under the more extreme matrilineal/matrilocal norms.
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5 Conclusion
We report an experiment to test whether patriarchic social norms make women shy away
from competing. Our main contribution is that we conduct this experiment not only in
societies with extreme social norms, which put one of the sexes at an obvious advantage,
but also in a traditional society with gender-balanced norms, where both sexes have
similarly important rights and entitlements. The second innovation of our research design
is that we have located this community through a systematic comparison of social norms
among the universe of traditional societies that populate the western part of India’s
panhandle, drawing on an extremely rich but thus-far untapped anthropological atlas.
This approach also allows us to make a strong case that confounding factors in the form
of differences in characteristics other than social norms, such as environmental factors and
subsistence mode, are minor in our experimental sample. On the other hand, a limitation
of our design owed to logistic constraints is the relatively small sample size that limits
the power of our comparisons of the gender-balanced society with the two more extreme
forms of social organization.
Across the three societies in our experimental sample, we find a significant gender dif-
ference in competitiveness only in the patriarchic society and none in the gender-balanced
and the matrilineal ones. In addition, a gender difference in the optimality of experimen-
tal choices is absent in both the gender-balanced and the matrilineal community.
While the traditional communities are different from modern societies in several re-
gards, we think that some important insights can be obtained from our study for gender
differences in preferences to compete in modern societies documented by several authors
since Niederle and Vesterlund’s (2007) seminal work. In particular, our results support
the view that gender differences in competitiveness are primarily due to socialization and
less to biological factors. First, the difference in competitiveness between men and women
melts away as we move from a traditional patriarchic to a traditional gender-balanced
society. Second, the fact that men still compete slightly more often when pooling the
data from all three societies, even though our research design aims to represent a balance
of communities on the patriarchy-matriarchy spectrum, is consistent with the observa-
tion that the norms represented in our study sample still slightly favor men on average.
According to the anthropological atlas that we have processed, the gender-balanced so-
ciety studied by us still assigns a slightly higher social status to men while women in the
matrilineal society do not assume all the roles held by men in the patriarchic society.
Our results also support the view that the gender differences in competitiveness doc-
umented in modern societies, which are of a similar order of magnitude as those observed
in traditional patriarchic societies, are a consequence of a patriarchic heritage. While our
research cannot resolve whether patriarchic implicit norms or lags in behavioral changes
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are responsible for women’s lower competitiveness in modern societies, our result that
competitiveness is nearly on par across the sexes in a traditional society with almost
gender-balanced norms suggests that the societies of high-income countries, which have
adopted balanced de jure norms more or less recently, still have a long way to go to also
achieve a gender balance in behaviors that appear to be fostered by balanced de facto
norms in the long run.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the patriarchy index
Source: Own calculations with data coded from the anthropological atlas People of India
(Singh, 1994 and 2003)
23
Figure 2: Experimental results
Source: Authors’ experimental outcomes data
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Table 1. Social norms relevant for women's status in 26 communities of Assam and Meghalaya
Community State
Post-marital 
Residence
Inheritance Descent
Patriarchy 
Index
Boro Meghalaya -1 -1 -1 -3
Chakma Assam -1 -1 -1 -3
Garo Meghalaya 1 1 1 3
Hajong Meghalaya -1 -1 -1 -3
Hmar Assam -1 -1 -1 -3
Jaintia Meghalaya 1 1 1 3
Kachari  Mech Assam -1 -1 -1 -3
Kachari Barman Assam -1 0 -1 -2
Kachari Boro Assam -1 -1 -1 -3
Kachari Dimasa Assam 0 0 0 0
Kachari Hojai Assam -1 -1 -1 -3
Kachari Sonowal Assam -1 -1 -1 -3
Karbi/Mikir Assam -1 -1 -1 -3
Khasi Meghalaya 1 1 1 3
Koch Meghalaya 1 1 1 3
Kuki Assam -1 -1 -1 -3
Lalung Meghalaya 1 1 1 3
Mishing Assam 0 -1 -1 -2
Mizo Biate Meghalaya . -1 -1 .
Naga Kabui (Rongmei) Assam -1 -1 -1 -3
Show Fonts Assam 0 -1 -1 -2
Naga Rengma Assam -1 -1 -1 -3
Naga Sema Assam 0 -1 -1 -2
Naga Zeimei (Zeliang) Assam -1 -1 . .
Rabha Assam . -1 -1 .
Riang Assam 0 -1 -1 -2
Source: People of India compiled by the authors. A value of -1 (+1) indicates that the respective norm is
pro-male (pro-female), while a value of zero indicates a gender-balanced norm. For post-marital residence
the norm is coded as +1 , 0 and -1 if matrilocality, neolocality (or ambilocality or duolocality), and
patrilocality is followed, respectively. For inheritance a society is coded +1, 0, and -1 if female
inheritance, duolineal inheritance or gender-neutral equigeniture, and male inheritance is followed,
respectively. For descent norms a society is coded +1, 0, and -1 if matrilineality, duolineality, and
patrilineality is followed, respectively. A “.” indicates that the respective norm is missing from the
People of India text. The Patriarchy Index is the horizontal sum of the three preceding columns.
Karbi Dimasa Khasi
Post-marital residence Patrilocal Neolocal Matrilocal
Descent Patrilineal Double descent Matrilineal
Inheritance Male primogeniture Duolineal and equigeniture Female ultimogeniture
Source: People of India  as coded by the authors.
Table 2. Social Norms in the Karbi, Dimasa and Khasi Societies
Pooled Women Men Pooled Women Men Pooled Women Men
Age (Years) 34.8 33.4 36.2 36.9 33.4 40.5 42.1 39.6 44.6
(8.3) (6.8) (9.5) (7.6) (6.4) (7.1) (10.3) (8.1) ###
Education (Years) 5.4 4.3 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.9 5.3 6.4 4.2
(3.9) (3.7) (3.8) (4.0) (4.2) (3.9) (5.2) (5.4) (4.9)
Spouse's education 5.9 6.8 5.0 6.5 7.2 5.8 4.1 5.1 3.2
(3.5) (3.3) (3.5) (4.1) (3.8) (4.4) (5.0) (5.4) (4.4)
Monthly income 5.5 6.1 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.5 7.3 6.4 8.1
  (in Rs. Thousand) (4.9) (6.3) (3.0) (3.6) (3.1) (4.0) (10.8) (10.9) ###
Marital status
  Married (monogamy) (%) 95 94 97 100 100 100 98.4 96.9 100
  Married (polygyny)  (%) 1.6 0 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
  Widow(er)  (%) 1.6 3.1 0 0 0 0 1.6 3.1 0
  Divorced  (%) 1.6 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Relation to head of household (HHH)
  Respondent is HHH (%) 53.1 6.3 100 50.0 0 100 51.6 3.1 100
  Spouse (%) 46.9 93.8 0 50.0 100 0 48.4 96.9 0
Principal occupation of respondent
  Farmer (%) 90.6 84.4 96.9 81.3 75.0 87.5 90.5 93.6 87.5
  Teacher (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.8 6.5 3.1
  Service (%) 3.12 3.1 3.1 3.1 6.3 0 1.6 0 3.1
  Trading (%) 0 0 0 3.1 3.1 3.1 1.6 0 3.1
  Unemployed (%) 0 0 0 1.6 3.1 0 1.6 0 3.1
  Other (%) 6.25 12.5 0 10.9 12.5 9.4 0 0 0
Household owns land (%) 98.4 100.0 96.9 89.1 93.8 84.4 71.9 68.8 75.0
Observations 64 32 32 64 32 32 64 32 32
Table 3. Participants' characteristics
DimasaKarbi
Notes: Means, standard deviations in parentheses. Education denotes completed years of schooling; income
denotes monthly average household income (self-reported); relation to head of household denotes whether
the participant is household head (HHH) or the household head's spouse; principal occupation denotes the
respondent's primary economic activity.
Khasi
Pooled Women Men Pooled Women Men Pooled Women Men
Experiment summary: competition
   Compete 0.55 0.41 0.69 0.48 0.44 0.53 0.47 0.50 0.44
(0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.50) (0.51) (0.50)
   Success 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.95 1.53 2.38 2.09 1.84 2.34
(1.11) (1.16) (1.08) (1.27) (0.95) (1.41) (1.20) (1.14) (1.23)
   Earnings 19.84 15.00 24.69 29.84 22.50 37.19 26.56 22.50 30.63
(27.86) (17.41) (35.01) (32.24) (28.85) (34.19) (30.46) (25.14) (34.91)
Observations 64 32 32 64 32 32 64 32 32
Those who chose to compete
   Success 1.29 1.08 1.41 1.94 2.00 1.88 1.80 1.44 2.21
(1.05) (0.76) (1.18) (1.09) (0.88) (1.27) (1.13) (1.03) (1.12)
   Won-loss-tie 13-12-10 4-4-5 9-8-5 14-10-7 6-5-3 8-5-4 9-15-6 3-7-6 6-8-0
   Earnings 26.29 16.92 31.82 40.65 36.43 44.12 30.00 22.50 38.57
(34.99) (22.13) (40.19) (41.63) (38.95) (44.59) (42.67) (34.35) (50.51)
   Earnings if choice reversed 12.86 10.77 14.09 19.35 20.00 18.82 18.00 14.38 22.14
(10.45) (7.60) (11.82) (10.93) (8.77) (12.69) (11.26) (10.31) (11.22)
Those who chose not to compete
   Success 1.21 1.37 0.90 1.97 1.17 2.93 2.35 2.25 2.44
(1.21) (1.38) (0.74) (1.42) (0.86) (1.39) (1.23) (1.13) (1.34)
   Won-loss-tie 8-9-12 5-7-7 3-2-5 13-17-3 4-13-1 9-4-2 13-7-14 5-4-7 8-3-7
   Earnings 12.07 13.68 9.00 19.70 11.67 29.33 23.53 22.50 24.44
(12.3) (13.8) (7.4) (14.2) (8.6) (13.9) (12.3) (11.3) (13.4)
   Earnings if choice reversed 20.69 23.16 16.00 40.91 15.56 71.33 44.12 36.88 50.56
(33.59) (39.31) (19.55) (52.28) (29.35) (58.17) (41.93) (37.54) (45.56)
Interim optimality of choices
   Over-entry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.19 0.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.37) (0.30) (0.38) (0.40) (0.37)
   Under-entry 0.31 0.41 0.22 0.28 0.19 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.44
(0.47) (0.50) (0.42) (0.45) (0.40) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
   Decision optimal 0.69 0.59 0.78 0.59 0.66 0.53 0.42 0.44 0.41
(0.47) (0.50) (0.42) (0.50) (0.48) (0.51) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Experiment summary: risk
   Amount bet 26.56 25.31 27.81 19.06 17.5 20.63 21.56 18.75 24.38
(8.21) (6.21) (9.75) (8.11) (8.03) (8.01) (12.63) (11.85) (12.94)
Observations 64 32 32 64 32 32 64 32 32
Table 4. Participants' choices
KhasiDimasaKarbi
Notes: Means, standard deviations in parentheses. Compete denotes whether the subject opted for the competitive
remuneration scheme in the competition task; success denotes the number of successful tosses in the ball tossing task (out
of 5 balls thrown); earnings give the amount earned (in Rs.) from the ball-tossing experiment. This amount equals 10 times
the number of successes if the participant chose not to compete. It equals 30 times the number of successes if the subject
chose to compete and won the competition. It equals 10 times the number of successes if the subject chose to compete and
tied. It equals zero if the subject chose to compete and lost the competition; earnings if choice is reversed denotes the
hypothetical earnings if the subject had made the complementary choice in the competition task.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Estimation Sample: Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Karbi Karbi Dimasa Dimasa Khasi Khasi
Dimasa -0.16 -0.15 -0.12 -0.12
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Khasi -0.25** -0.24* -0.23* -0.22
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Female -0.28** -0.29** -0.27** -0.28** -0.28** -0.36** -0.09 -0.04 0.06 0.04
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)
Dimasa - Female Interaction 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Khasi - Female Interaction 0.34* 0.33* 0.36** 0.34*
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Risk Preference (Amount Bet, in Rs.100) 0.47 0.39 -0.15 0.95 0.29
(0.37) (0.38) (0.73) (0.85) (0.57)
Constant 0.69*** -3.75 0.56*** -3.72 0.69*** -32.34** 0.53*** 4.14 0.44*** 11.64
(0.08) (9.58) (0.14) (9.54) (0.08) (14.02) (0.09) (18.58) (0.09) (14.26)
Observations 192 192 192 192 64 64 64 64 64 64
R-squared 0.035 0.043 0.043 0.048 0.080 0.156 0.009 0.037 0.004 0.062
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
H0: Female ≥ 0 (p-value) 0.012 0.006 0.230 0.395 0.688 0.617
H0: Dimasa-Female Interaction ≤ 0 (p-value) 0.143 0.141 0.141 0.142
H0: Khasi - Female Interaction ≤ 0 (p-value) 0.026 0.037 0.022 0.032
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the subject chooses the competitive (=1) or the piece-rate (=0)  remuneration scheme.
Control variables: Age, education, female household head (dummy), land ownership (dummy), principal occupation farmer (dummy).
In columns 1 through 6, Karbi men are the reference category. In columns 7 and 8 (9 and 10) Dimasa (Khasi) men are the reference category.
Table 5. Regression results: Competition choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Estimation Sample: Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Karbi Karbi Dimasa Dimasa Khasi Khasi
Dimasa -0.25** -0.21* -0.05 0.01
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Khasi -0.38*** -0.30** -0.22* -0.12
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Female -0.19 -0.23* -0.16 -0.20* -0.19 -0.26** 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.07
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13)
Dimasa - Female Interaction 0.31* 0.29* 0.23 0.19
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Khasi - Female Interaction 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.24
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17)
Risk Preference (Amount Bet, in Rs.100) 1.04*** 1.12*** 0.01 1.93*** 1.45***
(0.35) (0.32) (0.69) (0.69) (0.47)
Ability (Successful Tosses) -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12** -0.10** -0.11**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.78*** -9.65 0.63*** -11.32 0.78*** -36.73*** 0.53*** 8.14 0.41*** -3.49
(0.07) (9.25) (0.13) (8.68) (0.07) (12.03) (0.09) (16.48) (0.09) (13.75)
Observations 192 192 192 192 64 64 64 64 64 64
R-squared 0.067 0.087 0.162 0.193 0.041 0.237 0.016 0.181 0.001 0.241
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
H0: Female ≥ 0 (p-value) 0.054 0.021 0.842 0.773 0.598 0.697
H0: Dimasa-Female Interaction ≤ 0 (p-value) 0.033 0.049 0.085 0.139
H0: Khasi - Female Interaction ≤ 0 (p-value) 0.100 0.079 0.116 0.077
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the subject's competition choice is interim-optimal.
Control variables: Age, education, female household head (dummy), land ownership (dummy), principal occupation farmer (dummy).
In columns 1 through 6, Karbi men are the reference category. In columns 7 and 8 (9 and 10) Dimasa (Khasi) men are the reference category.
Table 6. Regression results: Optimality of decision to compete
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Figure A1: Summary of coding and scoring for post-marital residence norms
(b) Matrilocal(ity) / Uxorilocal(ity)
(c) Neolocal(ity)
(d) Ambilocal(ity)?
Notes:
Decision/score taken/assigned by the coder
Score assigned mechanically to the norm identified by the coder:  -1 for patrilocality, +1 for matrilocality, 0 for neolocality and ambilocality.
Does the text  literally mention or describe otherwise 
any of the following norms:
(a) Patrilocal(ity)/ Virilocal(ity)/ Patri-neolocal(ity)
No Residence Norm Score
Any norm 
other than 
(a), (b), (c), 
(d) described 
in the text?
Describe normNo Yes Residence Norm Score
Does more 
than one of 
the norms (a), 
(b), (c), (d) 
appear in the 
text?
Of (a), (b), (c), 
(d), identify most 
significant norm
Yes Yes Residence Norm Score
No
Residence Norm Score 
set to missing
Figure A2: Summary of coding and scoring for descent norms
Notes:
Decision/score taken/assigned by the coder
Score assigned mechanically to the norm identified by the coder: 
 -1 for patrilineal, +1 for matrilineal, 0 for double descent.
Score assigned mechanically to the norm identified by the coder if family head's biological son or other adult male succeeds as family head
 -1 if one of the father’s biological sons succeeds his father as family head,
+1 if a male adult who may or may not be the current head’s biological son (e.g. a son in law) succeeds as the head of the family.
Score assigned by the coder if other succession norm is described in the text.
Does the text  literally mention 
or describe otherwise any of the 
following descent norms: No Descent Norm Score
Descent Norm Score
Any norm other 
than (a), (b), (c) 
described in the 
text?
No Yes Descent Norm Score
No
 (a) Patrilineal
(b) Matrilineal
       (c) Double descent?
Describe norm
Do norms ruling 
succession to family 
headship appear in 
the text?
Yes
No
Descent Norm Score 
set to missing
Does more than 
one of the norms 
(a), (b), (c) 
appear in the 
text?
Of (a), (b), (c), 
identify most 
significant norm
Yes Yes Descent Norm Score
Figure A3: Summary of coding and scoring for inheritance norms
Notes:
Decision taken by the coder
Score assigned mechanically
Inheritance Norm Score +1
... by sons and 
daughters to 
similar extents
... primarily by 
daughters or a 
daughter, or the 
sister's son
Agricultural assets 
are inherited ...
... primarily by 
sons or a son
Do daughters 
inherit 
mother's 
personal 
belongings?
Do daughters 
have an 
additional 
inheritance 
entitlement?
No
Yes
Yes
No
Inheritance Norm Score -1
Inheritance Norm Score 0
EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
Welcome to this study of decision-making. The experiment will take about 10 minutes. The
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of
money. All the money you earn is yours to keep and will be paid to you, in cash, immediately after
the experiment ends. In addition to any earnings you might have in this task, you will be paid 100
rupees to participate. 
I
At the beginning of this experiment you will receive 100 rupees. You can split this 100 rupees
freely between you and your children. Depending on the money you give to your children they
will receive any of the schooling items of your choice. The rest of the money will be accumulated
in your total balance.
Ask them how much they want to give to their children and how much they want to keep.
(Record the money split)
II
Next, you will receive 50 rupees. You are asked to choose the portion of this amount (between 0
and 50) that you wish to invest in a risky option. The rest of the money will be accumulated in your
total balance.
The risky investment: there is an equal chance that the investment will fail or succeed. If the
investment fails, you lose the amount you invested. If the investment succeeds, you receive 3 times
the amount invested.
How do we determine if you win? After you have chosen how much you wish to invest, you will
toss a coin to determine whether you win or lose. If the coin comes up heads, you win 3 times the
amount you chose to invest. If the coin comes up tails, you lose the amount invested.
Examples
1. If you choose to invest nothing, you will get the 50 rupees for sure. That is, the coin flip would
not affect your profits.
2. If you choose to invest all of the 50 rupees, then if the coin comes up heads, you win 150 rupees,
and if the coin comes up tails, you win nothing and end up with 0.
3. If you choose to invest 30, then if the coin comes up heads, you win 110 (20 + 3 x 30), and if the
coin lands on tails, you win 20. 
Do you have any questions?
Ask them how much they would like to invest.
(Record the outcome of the lottery and calculate the amount)
(Do not tell the outcome of the lottery)
III
The task that we ask you to perform today is throwing this ball into this bucket from this line.
(Show them the ball, bucket, and line.) You will have 5 tries.
We now ask you to choose one of two options according to which you will be paid in the
experiment
There are two payment options:
 Option 1: If you choose this option,you will get 10rupees for each time you get the ball in the
bucket in your 5 tries. So if you succeed 1 time, then you will get 10 rupees. If you succeed 2 times,
then you will get 20 rupees. If you succeed 3 times, you will get 30 rupees, and so on.
  Option 2: If you choose this option, you will receive a reward only if you succeed more times than
the person who is playing in the next room. If you succeed more than this person, you will be paid
30 rupees for every time you succeed. So if you succeed 1 time, then you will get 30 rupees. If you
succeed 2 times, then you will get 60 rupees. If you succeed 3 times, you will get 90 rupees and so
on. But you will only receive a reward if you are better than the person in the next room. If you both
succeed the same number of times, you will both get 10 rupees for each success. If you succeed the
less number of times, you will get nothing.
We now ask you to choose how you want to be paid: according to Option 1 or Option 2. 
Record their choice: Option 1 or Option 2.
Now you may play.
Allow the participant to toss the balls and record the result on the survey sheet. You can record the
result of each toss with a check mark (√) and X (check mark (√) for success and X for failure). At
the end of the 5 tosses, write the total number of successes on the survey sheet and the money value
of each toss (based on his/her choice). Also write down whether his/her succeeded more than
his/her opponent with win (W) or lose (L) or tie (T).
(Compare and record the money earned )
(Conduct the exit survey privately)
(After survey make final payments in cash and offer them to choose schooling item)
SCHOOLING ITEMS
We offer you to take any one or any combination of schooling items indicated here for your
children. Suppose you have given 50 rupees for your children, you can take a geometry box.
You can also choose more than one item within the money you have given to your children.
For example, if you gave 40 rupees you can take either one pencil box or two glue sticks or 4
Wax crayons. But you cannot take cash.
Cost of the item Description
Rupees 10 Wax crayons
Rupees 20 Glue stick
Rupees 30 Gel Pen
Rupees 40 Pencil box
Rupees 50 Geometry box
Rupees 60 Stapler
Rupees 70 Writing board
Rupees 80 Tiffin box
Rupees 90 Water bottle
Rupees 100 Calculator
Ask them which child should get the schooling item.
(mark it in the exit survey)
Now, you can ask questions or clarifications before the experiment starts. But you cannot consult
anybody during the experiment.
You do not need to write the total payment on the card. Tell the participant he/she must go to the
person who will fill out an exit survey. Once he/she has filled out this survey, he/she should take the
card and the survey to the “cashier” and he/she will receive payment. If they ask you what to do:
Tell them that you cannot give them advice about what to choose and offer to read the script to
them again.
***
